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ABSTRACT
Agency Problems in Target-Date Funds
BY
Vallapuzha V. Sandhya
November 14, 2011
Committee Chair:

Dr.Vikas Agarwal

Major Academic Unit:

Department of Finance

Target-Date Funds (TDFs) facilitate retirement planning by varying asset allocation over
time with the goal of reducing portfolio risk. We explore potential agency problems in TDFs
by examining their return performance and flow-performance relation. We find that TDFs
under-perform balanced funds (BFs) which are also approved as a default option along with
TDFs in 401(k) plans with automatic enrollment. We show that the under-performance is
driven by TDFs that have a fund-of-fund structure and constituent funds with high expense
ratios or poor performance within the fund family. Additionally, we discover an absence of
flow-performance relation in TDFs while BFs exhibit the convex flow-performance relation
shown for mutual funds. Our evidence suggests the presence of agency problems in TDFs
arising from investor inertia, weak incentives for fund managers to outperform peers, and
opportunities for fund families to gain private benefits.

vii

Agency Problems in Target-Date Funds
“Of all the issues that the SEC is examining at the moment, our review of target date funds
is one that may most directly affect everyday Americans . . . ”
- Mary Schapiro,
Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission, at the public hearing on Target-Date Funds
and other similar investment options, held on June 18, 2009.

1.

Introduction
Target-Date Funds (TDFs) are popular retirement investment vehicles that follow a

predetermined schedule for rebalancing their mix of equity and fixed-income securities over
time. Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 resulted in widespread adoption of TDFs as the
default option in 401(k) plans with automatic enrollment.1 This paper provides evidence of
agency problems in TDFs that arise when economic agents are not properly incentivized or
when agents face conflicts of interest while executing their duties to principals. Provision of
incentives in the case of mutual funds can be in the form of greater (lower) flows following
good (poor) performance while conflicts of interest manifests through self-dealing. Our
findings raise questions regarding the suitability of TDFs as a default option in 401(k) plans.
In the first part of the paper focusing on incentives facing the TDFs, we study the flowperformance relation and find that flows do not respond to past performance suggesting

1

Among plans with automatic enrollment, 87% administered by Vanguard and 96% by Fidelity used

TDFs as the default instrument in 2008. See GAO report to Chairman, Special Committee on Aging, U.S.
Senate, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1031.pdf

that retirement plan participants neither reward nor punish TDFs.2 This, in turn, seems to
indicate lack of incentives for TDFs to provide superior performance for their investors. In
contrast to TDFs, balanced funds (BFs), which are also approved but are not as widely used
as default option in 401(k) plans, exhibit convex flow-performance relation indicating that
its investors chase performance. The test of relative performance shows that TDFs trail BFs
by 48 (86) basis points annually based on risk-adjusted net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) performance.
In the second part of the paper, we examine different subgroups within TDFs to show
that the subgroup with the greatest scope for conflicts of interest under-performs the rest.
TDFs structured as Single Funds (SF) invest directly in stocks and bonds while those with
the fund-of-fund (FOF) structure either invest in other mutual funds within the same fund
family (Internal FOF) or in funds outside the family (External FOF). Of the three structures,
Internal FOFs are likely to have the greatest potential for conflicts of interest. In particular,
they may choose to include funds with high expense ratios to increase revenues to the family.
Alternately, they may include funds with poor performance and/or low flows to sustain funds
that may be less marketable. Why would plan sponsors who have the fiduciary responsibility
allow this? A possible explanation stems from their own conflicts of interest due to a
desire to secure votes in favor of management on shareholder proposals and the prospect
to overweight securities of the firm in institutional portfolios (e.g., Davis and Kim, 2007;
Cohen and Schmidt, 2009). In this study, we do not attempt to distinguish between the
roles played by the plan sponsor and the fund family. Thus, TDFs with the Internal FOF
2

Plan participants’ failure to punish poor performance is consistent with the evidence shown in prior

studies that suggest inertia among retirement investors in changing the asset allocation of their 401(k)
plans (e.g., Madrian and Shea, 2001; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003; Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and
Yamaguchi, 2006; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2006; Benartzi and Thaler, 2007). In addition,
Gruber (1996) suggests that pension plan participants that are restricted by their plans may not move
money out of funds that perform poorly.

2

structure appear to face the greatest potential for agency problems in the principal-agent
relation. We investigate the relative performance of the three sub-categories of TDFs and find
that the Internal FOFs under-perform SFs by 58 (132) basis points and External FOFs by
55 (63) basis points based on risk-adjusted net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) performance. In contrast,
External FOFs perform at par with the SFs.
In the third part, we provide further evidence suggestive of the channels for the manifestation
of agency problems using the holdings of TDFs with the FOF structure obtained from the
N-Q, N-CSR, and N-CSRS filings mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). We find that among funds that are constituents of TDFs, those with higher expense
ratios or lower performance have a greater probability of inclusion in an Internal FOF than in
an External FOF. Similarly, among funds that belong to a family that offers TDFs with the
Internal FOF structure, once again funds with higher expense ratios or lower performance
have a greater probability of inclusion in their TDFs. Our results are robust after controlling
for family and fund characteristics and to other specifications including estimation of alphas
over different horizons, alternate definition of expense ratios, trends over time, and variations
in asset allocation. Furthermore, we perform bootstrap simulations using residual and factor
resampling approach of Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) to show that
the documented under-performance is not attributable to sampling variability.
Overall, the findings in this paper have important policy implications as retirement
monies are defaulted into TDFs following their approval as Qualified Default Investment
Alternative (QDIA) in 401(k) plans. During the financial crisis in 2008, investors close to
retirement lost anywhere between 3.6% and 41% among the 31 TDFs with 2010 Target Date.3
The loss prompted a joint public hearing by the SEC and the Department of Labor (DOL)
3

Speech by Mary Schapiro, Chair of SEC, at the hearing on TDFs held on June 18, 2009. A transcript

of the hearing is found at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/TDFhearingtranscript.pdf
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leading to a regulation that requires prominent display of asset allocation in the marketing
material for TDFs. While the regulation helps in alleviating the ignorance of investors, it falls
short of addressing the potential agency problems highlighted in this paper. The findings in
our paper point to a conceivable solution that comes from understanding the difference in
the flow-performance sensitivity of BFs and TDFs resulting from their investor bases. While
TDFs are almost exclusively used by retirement investors, a major portion of BFs’ assets are
held outside retirement plans.4 Our results indicate that opening TDFs to non-retirement
accounts whose investors are performance sensitive, as is the case with BFs, may help bridge
the gap in performance of TDFs relative to BFs. In addition, closer attention could be paid
to the holdings of TDFs with the Internal FOF structure where the mutual fund families
might face conflicts of interest and therefore, may not always make investment decisions in
the best interest of their shareholders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related
literature and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 provides
evidence on lack of flow-performance sensitivity in TDFs followed by a discussion of the
tests of under-performance. Section 5 performs a battery of robustness checks and Section 6
concludes.

2.

Related literature and Hypotheses Development
This paper contributes to several strands of the finance literature. First, theoretical

studies analyze the life-cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice by introducing con-

4

According to a report by the Investment Company Institute, 88% of TDF assets were held in retirement

accounts in the year 2007 compared to 46% of balanced fund assets. See The US retirement market, 2007
http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v17n3.pdf - Research Fundamentals, July 2008, Vol 17, No.3.
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straints faced by an aging investor and deviations from the mean-variance framework (e.g.,
Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson, 1992; Viceira, 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005;
Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2007; Polkovnichenko,
2007; Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira, 2008; Viceira, 2009; Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell,
2009; Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise, 2009; Koijen, Nijman, and Werker, 2010). In particular, Bodie and Treussard (2007) evaluate the choice of TDFs in retirement plans and
conclude that they are not appropriate for risk averse investors or for those who have a high
exposure to market risk through their human capital. Although TDFs are gaining popularity
among investors, empirical research on these funds is still in its infancy. In their pioneering
work, Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2007) study the impact of inclusion of TDFs
in 401(k) plans of a single provider and find that TDFs reduce the problem of extreme asset
allocation and idiosyncratic portfolio risk. Ours is the first empirical study examining the
cross-sectional variations in the return performance as well as the flow-performance relation
of TDFs.
Second, we contribute to the strand of literature that pertains to investor behavior in
retirement plans which provides evidence that plan participants are passive (e.g., Madrian
and Shea, 2001; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick,
2006; Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi, 2006; Benartzi and Thaler, 2007) and lack
financial literacy (e.g., Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly, 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006,
2007a,b,c). Inertia among retirement plan participants provides captive investors leading to
potential agency problems in TDFs.
Third, we contribute to the flow-performance literature on mutual funds that documents
a convex relation between flows and past performance resulting in competition amongst
managers to outperform their peers (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano,
1998; Karceski, 2002; Berk and Green, 2004; Ivković and Weisbenner, 2009). Additionally,
5

it has been shown that fund flows are affected by factors like advertising (e.g., Jain and
Wu, 2000; Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks, 2005; Barber, Odean, and Zheng, 2005), spill over
effects from star funds (e.g., Nanda, Wang, and Zheng, 2004), name changes (e.g., Cooper,
Gulen, and Rau, 2005), and investors’ participation costs (e.g., Huang, Wei, and Yan, 2007)
to name a few. Flow-performance relation among pension funds is analyzed by Guercio
and Tkac (2002) who find that the relation is approximately linear as pension funds punish
poorly performing managers and do not disproportionately flock to winners. Given the
inertia among retirement plan participants, they are unlikely to punish poor performance
by withdrawing capital or reward good performance with more capital infusion. Hence, we
hypothesize that flows to TDFs should be unrelated to their past performance.
Finally, we contribute to the literature dealing with the agency issues in delegated
portfolio management. Some of the problems analyzed in extant literature are risk-shifting
(e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Blake, Elton, and
Gruber, 2003; Hu, Kale, Pagani, and Subramanian, 2011), window dressing (e.g., Lakonishok,
Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991; Carhart, Kaniel, Musto, and Reed, 2002; He, Ng, and
Wang, 2004; Ng and Wang, 2004; Meier and Schaumburg, 2004; Agarwal, Gay, and Ling,
2011), career concerns (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Brown, Goetzmann, and Park,
2001), and churning of assets (e.g., Allen and Gorton, 1993; Dow and Gorton, 1997). While
the above studies focus on issues at the fund level, Khorana and Servaes (1999), Massa (2003),
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2008), and Cici, Gibson, and
Moussawi (2010) study the “strategic” decisions made in the interests of the fund family.
Given that mutual funds manage 52% of defined contribution (DC) plan assets, it is
important for fund families to attract retirement plan sponsors.5 In this context, Davis
5

The US retirement market, 2007 http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v17n3.pdf - A report by Investment

Company Institute, July 2008, Vol 17, No.3.
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and Kim (2007) argue that fund families may not demand good corporate governance from
firms whose 401(k) plans they manage while Cohen and Schmidt (2009) find that mutual
fund families that act as trustees systematically overweight the sponsor firms’ stock in the
families’ funds. Hence, it is conceivable that plan sponsors might benefit from favorable
voting as well as overweighting of the firm’s stock in return for letting plan trustees include
under-performing or high-fee funds in TDFs offered in the 401(k) plan. Passive principals
coupled with conflicted agents suggest that TDFs may be prone to agency problems. A
natural baseline to measure the performance of TDFs is provided by BFs.6 On one hand,
BFs are an alternate choice available to plan sponsors as QDIA and have a similar investment
universe but are less susceptible to agency problems mentioned above as they are widely used
outside retirement plans. If agency problems affect the performance adversely, we expect
TDFs to under-perform BFs. On the other hand, BFs differ from TDFs in that their asset
allocation is fixed during inception while managers of TDFs need to rebalance the allocation
from time to time based on the glide path (predetermined asset allocation schedule). If
investors are willing to pay a price for this additional service, it may be reflected as lower
expected returns. Hence, we hypothesize that TDFs should under-perform BFs on the basis
of risk-adjusted performance.
To disentangle the two explanations for the underperformance of TDFs, we first divide
TDFs into two groups, funds that invest in other mutual funds (FOFs) and those that invest
in stocks, bonds, and other asset classes (SFs).7 Next, we compare the performance of each
group with that of BFs. If the under-performance is due to time-varying reallocation of
assets, we expect both sub-categories of TDFs to under-perform BFs. Thus, we can rule out

6

Similar comparison is made by Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008).

7

Funds with SF structure might invest a small portion (less than 20%) of their assets in money market

funds or index funds.

7

time-varying reallocation of assets as the cause of under-performance if any one of the subcategories of TDFs under-performs BFs. If the under-performance is due to the potential
for conflicts of interest, we expect TDFs with the FOF structure to under-perform as this
structure is likely to provide discretion to include funds that increase revenues to the family
or redirect flows as desired. However, there are two other factors that may cause the underperformance. Firstly, diversification across managers, a feature offered by TDFs with the
FOF structure may lower expected returns. Secondly, FOFs charge dual layer of fees which
may also reduce the net-of-fee returns. Hence, we hypothesize that TDFs with the FOF
structure should under-perform BFs while TDFs with the SF structure should perform at
par with BFs.
To disentangle the cause of under-performance of TDFs with the FOF structure, we
further analyze their subcategories. While some FOFs invest in funds offered by their own
family (Internal FOFs), others invest in funds from other families (External FOFs).8 Few
studies have examined the FOFs in the hedge fund industry (e.g., Brown, Goetzmann, and
Liang, 2002; Agarwal and Kale, 2007; Ang, Rhodes-Kropf, and Zhao, 2008) while the FOF
structure in mutual funds is largely unexplored with the exception of Bhattacharya, Lee, and
Pool (2010). If diversification across managers causes the under-performance, TDFs with
Internal as well as External FOF structure should under-perform those with the SF structure.
However, if dual layer of fees causes the under-performance, TDFs with Internal as well as
External FOF structure should under-perform those with the SF structure in the net-of-fee
but not in the gross-of-fee specification. However, if one of them under-performs SFs while
the other does not, then the under-performance is not attributable to diversification across

8

Apart from External and Internal FOFs, there are a few funds that invest in funds within the family as

well as funds outside the family (Mixed FOFs) and we combine them with External FOFs as dicussed later
in Section 4.2.

8

funds or dual layer of fees.9
A TDF with the FOF structure may choose to invest internally due to informational
advantages or due to the flexibility to move assets across funds with minimal transaction
costs. Elton, Gruber, and Green (2007) find that investors who confine their investments
to a single fund family tend to have more risky portfolios than if they select similar funds
across different families. Another explanation for internal investing could be that it provides
greater scope for “strategic” decision making.

For instance, fund families may choose

constituent funds with high expense ratio or redirect flows to funds within their stable
that are experiencing poor performance or low flows. If the costs associated with “strategic”
selection in the case of Internal FOFs exceed the benefits in the form of lower transaction
costs, Internal FOFs should under-perform External FOFs which forms our next hypothesis.
To find direct evidence of agency problems, we examine the constituent funds of Internal
FOFs and compare them with other funds within the family as well as the constituents of
External FOFs.10 If agency problems distort the selection process of constituent funds of
Internal FOFs, we hypothesize that constituent funds of Internal FOFs would have higher
expense ratios or lower performance or lower flows compared to other funds in the family or
those selected for External FOFs.

9

Systematic differences in asset allocation cannot explain the under-performance as we compare risk-

adjusted performance after explicitly controlling for differences in asset allocation.
10

Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) argue that from a family’s perspective, expected assets are higher

with a mix of funds delivering good and bad performance as opposed to funds reporting uniformly mediocre
performance. To this end, fund families may favor funds that are adding most value to the family at the
cost of other funds within the family.

9

3.

Data and variable construction
We describe the data sources for our analyses and explain the main variables in this

section.

3.1.

Data Description

The main source of data for our paper is the survivor-bias-free mutual fund database
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). While we identify BFs using the
Lipper objective code provided by CRSP, we use the target year in the fund’s name to
identify TDFs and ensure that they vary the equity/bond allocation along the glide path.
To analyze the constituent funds of TDFs with the FOF structure, we collect data from
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) quarterly filings (N-Q, N-CSR, N-CSRS) in
which the funds are required to provide a complete list of their holdings. We merge our
dataset with CRSP mutual fund database using fund names to obtain fund characteristics.
Consistent with Wermers (2000), we combine the characteristics of the share classes to obtain
the corresponding characteristic of the fund using the weighted averages in which the weights
are based on the assets in each share class. For this study, we consider the entire universe of
TDFs over the period January 2001 to December 2008 when the number of funds grew from
16 to 280 resulting in over 3,100 fund-quarter observations.
From the top panel of Table 1, we can see that the assets under management (AUM)
of TDFs experienced a 11-fold increase from $11.29 billion to $126.79 billion while BFs
experienced a modest increase. At year-end 2007, more than two-thirds of 401(k) plans in
the EBRI/ICI database included TDFs in their investment menu.11 From the middle panel,

11

See Investment Company Institute web page http://ici.org/faqs/faqs target date
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we can see that TDFs with the FOF structure grew phenomenally from $9.70 billion to
$121.08 billion while TDFs with the SF structure grew marginally during the same period.
The bottom panel shows the growth of Internal FOFs from $9.70 billion in 2001 to $114.45
billion in 2008 and External FOFs from $9.00 million in 2005 to $1.58 billion in 2008. Thus,
it is clear that the growth of TDFs is largely attributable to TDFs with the Internal FOF
structure.

3.2.

Key Variables

To analyze the flow-performance relation, we follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) and define
N etF lows for fund i in quarter t as

N etF lowsit =

AU Mit − AU Mit−1 ∗ (1 + Rit )
,
AU Mit−1

(1)

where AU Mit is the assets under management of fund i in quarter t and Rit is the return
of fund i in quarter t. Another important variable in our study is fund performance. While
it is the dependent variable for a majority of tests, we use it as an explanatory variable in
the flow-performance analysis. To measure performance, we use the risk-adjusted net-of-fee
return (alpha) obtained using an extension of Carhart (1997) four-factor model. While the
Carhart (1997) model has been used to measure the performance of domestic equity funds,
it may not be appropriate for TDFs as they also invest in bonds and international equity
(e.g., Comer, 2006; Blake, Elton, and Gruber, 2006). Failure to control for this additional
exposure attributes the excess return earned by these asset classes to alpha.
We use excess returns on Barclay’s Capital U.S. Aggregate index and MSCI EAFE
index as our bond and international equity factors as almost all TDFs use them as the

11

benchmarks for bond and international equity components of their portfolios.12 Thus, our
first performance measure for a fund in a given sub-period is the alpha estimated using the
following model:

ri,t = αi +β1,i M KT RFt +β2,i SM Bt +β3,i HM Lt +β4,i U M Dt +β5,i BON Dt +β6,i IN T EQt +i,t
(2)
where ri,t is the excess return earned by fund i in month t and M KT RFt is the value-weighted
return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate for
month t. Additionally, SM Bt , HM Lt , and U M Dt refer to the returns on value-weighted,
zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one-year
momentum in stock returns respectively. BON Dt is the return on the Barclay’s Capital
U.S. Aggregate index minus the one-month Treasury bill rate for month t, and IN T EQt is
the return on the MSCI EAFE index minus the one-month Treasury bill rate for month t.
Since our study spans a period of eight years, computing a single alpha for the whole period
might be too restrictive as it forces the funds to have constant betas over a long period.
Hence, we split the data into four time periods of two years each, estimate alphas using 24
month intervals, and run a panel regression by pooling observations in the four periods.13
A frequently cited critique of alphas is the questionable accuracy of the underlying asset
pricing model. An alternate measure of performance used in literature is the Sharpe ratio.
For each fund, we calculate the monthly Sharpe ratio for a given year by dividing the average
monthly excess returns by their standard deviation and subsequently annualize it. While

12

Blake, Elton, and Gruber (2007) use a similar multifactor model except for the momentum factor to

measure the performance of stock mutual funds that have exposure to bonds and international equity.
13

In specifications involving External and Mixed FOFs, we are restricted to using only the last four years

as these funds came into existence only in 2005.
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the six-factor alpha measures the risk-adjusted returns based on our asset pricing model,
Sharpe ratio measures the same by defining risk as the volatility of fund returns. Although,
this measure is useful to an investor that is not fully diversified, one must keep in mind that
Sharpe ratio can be inflated by reducing the volatility of returns. For robustness, we repeat
our analysis using risk-adjusted gross-of-fee performance measures. As CRSP mutual fund
database reports the net-of-fee returns, we add the expense ratios to estimate the gross-of-fee
returns. Additionally, in untabulated tests, we repeat our analysis using alphas estimated
over 18 and 36 month intervals and obtain qualitatively similar results.

3.3.

Control Variables

Our control variables based on extant literature are expense ratio (percentage of fund
assets paid for operating expenses, management fees, and 12B-1 fees excluding sales charges),
age (number of years since inception), turnover ratio (ratio of minimum of purchases and
sales made by the fund to the total assets under management), and AUM (dollar value of
assets in fund’s portfolio). Since age and AUM are known to have skewed distributions,
we take the logarithm of these variables. In the case of TDFs with the FOF structure,
the expense ratio as reported in CRSP does not include the fees paid to constituent funds.
Similarly, the turnover ratio as reported in CRSP understates the actual turnover as it does
not include the turnover of the underlying funds. Hence, we augment the values of expense
ratio and turnover ratio with the corresponding average values of the constituent funds.
To control for family effects, we include the total AUM of the family as an independent
variable. We also include the proportion of assets invested in bonds as an additional variable
to control for differences due to the asset allocation that may not be captured by our bond
factor. Finally, as our data have panel structure, we allow for clustering of standard errors
by fund families and quarters for all our tests unless specified otherwise.
13

4.

Empirical Results
In this section, we examine the potential for agency problems in TDFs by analyzing

the flow-performance relation of TDFs and BFs. Since TDFs are targeted at retirement
investors who may be passive or captive, they are unlikely to reward good performance or
punish poor performance. This inaction implies that in the case of TDFs, flows may be
unrelated to performance. BFs on the other hand are not primarily targeted at retirement
plan participants. Moreover, despite being approved as QDIA, they are not prevalently used
as the default instrument. Given that they are chosen by active investors similar to those
investing in open-end mutual funds, we expect their flow-performance relation to be similar
to that of equity funds.

4.1.

Analysis of Flow-Performance Relation

While Sirri and Tufano (1998) focus on equity funds, we extend the analysis to TDFs and
BFs. To evaluate fund performance for each quarter, we use the prior 24 monthly returns
of a fund and estimate its alpha using the six-factor model as explained in Section 3.2. For
our univariate analysis, we divide the funds into deciles based on their performance for that
quarter and calculate the average net flows in the subsequent quarter for each performance
decile using the definition provided in Section 3.2. In unreported tests, we find the flowperformance relation to be convex for BFs. However, in the case of TDFs, there is no clear
pattern in the flow-performance relation suggesting that investors fail to incentivize their
fund managers. We repeat our analysis using the four-factor model and find qualitatively
similar results.
For the multivariate analysis, we divide our data into BFs and TDFs and repeat the

14

analysis for both sub-groups using a simple linear regression given by the following model:
N etF lowsi,t+1 =β0 + β1 P erfi,t + β2 LogAU Mi,t + β3 ExpenseRatioi,t
(3)
+ β4 ObjF lowsi,t+1 + β2 RetV olati,t + i,t ,
where N etF lowsi,t+1 is the net percentage growth of fund i in quarter t + 1, P erfi,t is the
net-of-fee six-factor alpha, LogAU Mi,t is the log of assets under management of fund i in
quarter t, ExpenseRatioi,t is the expense ratio of fund i in quarter t, ObjF lowi,t+1 is the
growth of funds in quarter t + 1 with fund i’s investment objective, and RetV olati,t is the
standard deviation of returns over the previous 24 months ending in quarter t. In the case
of TDFs with the FOF structure, expense ratio is augmented by the average expense ratio
of the constituent funds.
While the above model assumes a linear relation, we follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) and
use the following piece-wise linear model to capture the convexity of the flow-performance
relation.
N etF lowsi,t+1 = β0 + β1 LowP erfi,t + β2 M idP erfi,t + β3 HighP erfi,t
+ β4 LogAU Mi,t + β5 ExpenseRatioi,t + β6 ObjF lowsi,t+1

(4)

+ β7 RetV olati,t + i,t .
We define LowP erfi,t as M in(0.2, RAN Ki,t ) where RAN Ki,t is defined as the percentile
performance (measured as the net-of-fee six-factor alpha) of fund i in quarter t relative
to other funds with the same investment objective. Similarly, we define M idP erfi,t as
M in(0.6, RAN Ki,t − LowP erfi,t ) and the highest quintile of performance as HighP erfi,t =
RAN Ki,t −(LowP erfi,t +M idP erfi,t ). Finally, all other variables are as defined in Equation 3.
Results from the linear model are reported in Table 2. We can see that the flows respond
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to past performance in the case of BFs while flows are unrelated to performance for TDFs.
The results from the piece-wise linear model provides evidence of a convex flow-performance
relation for BFs. We find the slopes of the performance-growth relation over the three ranges
to be significantly different from zero and based on the pairwise t-tests, we can reject the
hypothesis that performance sensitivity of the lowest quintile is the same as that of the
highest quintile as well as the middle three quintiles combined as in Sirri and Tufano (1998).
However, in the case of TDFs, we fail to reject the hypothesis that performance sensitivity
of the lowest quintile is the same as that of the highest quintile as well as the middle three
quintiles. Thus, the flow-performance relation of BFs is convex during our sample period
while there is no relation between flows and performance for TDFs. Another interesting
point is that while fund flows to mutual funds are negatively related to expense ratios in
the case of BFs, they are not sensitive to expense ratios in the case of TDFs. Thus, unlike
BFs, flows to TDFs are not related to performance or expenses and hence fail to provide
managers with incentives to outperform their peers. Instead, it incentivizes fund families to
sell poorly performing or high-fee funds which establishes the potential for agency problems
in TDFs. In unreported tests, we repeat the analysis with four-factor alphas as performance
measures as well as family fixed effects model and find qualitatively similar results.
Next, we present evidence of agency problems in TDFs and a mechanism through which
it manifests. We begin with the univariate analysis of BFs, TDFs, and their subcategories
followed by our tests for under-performance and conclude with our analysis of the determinants
of the constituents of FOFs that invest internally.
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4.2.

Univariate Analysis of BFs and TDFs

In Table 3, we present the average fund characteristics of TDFs and BFs in the first
two columns and the differences in the means in the third column. From the table, we
can see that TDFs under-perform BFs by 1.35% (2.52%) annually on a net-of-fee (gross-offee) risk-adjusted basis. Additionally, we find lower Sharpe ratios for TDFs relative to BFs
both on net-of-fee and gross-of-fee basis. Based on average fund characteristics, BFs are of
comparable size, older, have lower net flows, lower equity allocation, higher bond allocation,
and lower volatility of monthly returns compared to TDFs. It is interesting to note that
TDFs under-perform BFs despite having greater volatility of returns and lower allocation to
bonds.
In Table 4, we provide the characteristics of TDFs having the FOF and SF structures in
the first two columns and the differences in the means in the third column. We find that
based on our risk-adjusted performance measure, FOFs under-perform SFs by 1.76% (2.96%)
annually on a net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) basis. Furthermore, we find lower Sharpe ratios for
FOFs relative to SFs both on net-of-fee and gross-of-fee basis. Additionally, FOFs tend to be
larger, younger, and have higher net flows, higher equity component, lower bond component,
and higher volatility in monthly returns compared to SFs. Once again, we find that FOFs
under-perform SFs despite having higher volatility of returns and lower bond allocation.
In the first three columns of Table 5, we present the fund characteristics of the three
sub-groups of FOFs namely Internal, External, and Mixed FOFs. In the remaining three
columns, we present the differences in the means. From the fourth column, we can see that
the Internal FOFs under-perform External FOFs by 29 (62) basis points annually on a netof-fee (gross-of-fee) risk-adjusted basis. However, we find higher Sharpe ratio for Internal
FOFs relative to External FOFs both on net-of-fee and gross-of-fee basis. This might mean
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that Internal FOFs are exposed to greater systematic risk relative to External FOFs.
Internal FOFs are larger, older, and have higher turnover ratio, lower flows, lower
expense ratio, lower equity allocation, higher bond allocation, and lower volatility in monthly
returns. Additionally, we report the weighted average turnover ratio and expense ratio of
the constituent funds. We can see that the Internal FOFs have constituents with greater
expense ratios and higher turnover ratios. While the revenue generated from the fees paid
to constituent funds is redirected to the fund family’s coffers in the case of Internal FOFs,
it is paid to other fund families in the case of External FOFs. From the fifth and sixth
columns, we can see that the Mixed FOFs are comparable in performance to the Internal
FOFs but under-perform External FOFs. For our subsequent analysis, we combine Mixed
FOFs with the External FOFs as managers of both categories have the option of including
funds from families outside. To the extent that managers of Mixed FOFs have opportunities
for “strategic” selection, it will bias our tests against finding under-performance. Our results
are qualitatively similar when we repeat our analysis after excluding Mixed FOFs from the
data.

4.3.

Performance of Target-Date Funds relative to Balanced Funds

We start our multivariate analysis by comparing the performance of TDFs with that
of BFs. Our data for this test consists of all fund-quarter observations during the period
January 2001 to December 2008. We use the following model to conduct our analysis:
P erfi,t = κ0 + κ1 T DFi + κ2 ExpenseRatioi,t + κ3 LogAgei,t
+ κ4 LogAU Mi,t + κ5 T urnoveri,t + κ6 N etF lowi,t
+ κ7 F amilyAU Mi,t + κ8 Bondi,t + i,t ,
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(5)

where the dependent variable P erfi,t is the performance measure of the ith fund in the tth
quarter and T DFi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the ith fund is a TDF and 0
otherwise. LogAgei,t is the log of age of the ith fund in the tth quarter while T urnoveri,t is the
turnover ratio of the ith fund in the tth quarter. In the case of TDFs with the FOF structure,
T urnoveri,t includes the average turnover ratio of the constituent funds. Although we use
risk-adjusted performance measures, we control for any residual impact of asset allocation
by including Bondi,t , the percentage of assets invested by fund i in fixed income securities
in the tth quarter. To control for family effects, we include F amilyAU Mi,t , the log of assets
under management of the fund family. All other variables are as defined in Equation 3.
We present the results for six-factor alpha as the performance measure in columns three
and four of Table 6 while columns five and six contain corresponding results with Sharpe
ratio as the performance measure. Since our baseline case is balanced funds, the negative
sign on the TDF dummy indicates that TDFs under-perform BFs. This under-performance
ranges from 48 basis points annually based on net-of-fee alphas to 86 basis points annually
based on gross-of-fee alphas. Additionally, TDFs also have lower Sharpe ratios compared
to BFs as indicated by the negative coefficient of −0.59 (−0.60) for the net-of-fee (grossof-fee) Sharpe ratio results. The greater under-performance of the gross-of-fee specification
indicates that BFs tend to have higher expense ratios. To compute the average six-factor
alpha for each of the category of funds, we evaluate Equation 5 using the mean values for
the control variables. Based on our calculations, the average net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) annual
six-factor alpha for TDFs is −1.27 (−0.07) while that of BFs is −0.79 (0.78).
To ensure that the under-performance that we document does not occur by chance, we
perform bootstrap simulation comparable to the residual and factoring procedure described
in Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006). To start with, we estimate the
alphas, factor loadings, and residual returns using the six-factor model for all TDFs and
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BFs in our data for each of the four sub-periods and store the coefficient estimates {β̂1,i ,
β̂2,i , . . . β̂6,i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N } and the time series of the estimated residuals {ˆi,t , i =
1, 2, . . . N, t = 1, 2, . . . T }. Subsequently, for each bootstrap iteration b, we draw samples
with replacement from the funds’ stored residuals {ˆbi,te , te = sb1 , sb2 , . . . sbT }, and the factor
returns {M KT RFtb , SM Btb , HM Lbt , U M Dtb , BON Dtb , IN T EQbt , t = ub1 , ub2 , . . . ubT } where
sb1 , sb2 , . . . sbT and ub1 , ub2 , . . . ubT denote the time reordering imposed by the bootstrap. This
enables us to construct the time series of simulated returns for all the BFs and TDFs in each
of the sub-periods subject to zero alphas as follows:
b
ri,t
=β̂1,i M KT RFtb + β̂2,i SM Btb + β̂3,i HM Lbt

+

β̂4,i U M Dtb

+

β̂5,i BON Dtb

+

β̂6,i IN T EQbt

(6)
+

ˆbi,te

where ri,t , M KT RFt , SM Bt , HM Lt , U M Dt , BON Dt , IN T EQt , and ˆi,t are as defined in
Subsection 3.2 and b refers to the bootstrap number. The resulting simulated returns thus
generated have the same number of funds in the cross-section as well as the same number of
return observations per fund as in the data. We then reestimate the net-of-fee alphas for the
TDFs and BFs for each of the four sub-periods and repeat the analysis in Equation 5 using
the bootstrapped alphas to test whether the coefficient of the TDF dummy is negative. We
run a total of 1,000 bootstrap iterations and find the mean value of the TDF coefficient to
be smaller than 0.0001 and not significantly different from zero at the 1% confidence level
indicating that the under-performance results we obtain is not due to chance.
If agency issues do not play a role, then the difference in performance of TDFs relative
to BFs can be construed as the premium that investors are willing to pay for the automatic
rebalancing feature. To disentangle the two explanations, we compare the performance of
the two structures of TDFs, namely FOFs and SFs, with that of BFs in the next sub-section.
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4.4.

Automatic-rebalancing versus strategic selection

To tease out the cause of under-performance, we investigate the performance of the
subcategories of TDFs. To this end, we estimate the following regression for all TDFs and
BFs in our data.
P erfi,t =κ0 + κ1 F OFi + κ2 SFi + κ3 ExpenseRatioi,t + κ4 LogAgei,t +
κ5 LogAU Mi,t + κ6 T urnoveri,t + κ7 N etF lowi,t +

(7)

κ8 F amilyAU Mi,t + κ9 Bondi,t + i,t ,
where the dependent variable P erfi,t is the performance measure of the ith TDF in the tth
quarter, F OFi is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the ith TDF has FOF structure and 0
otherwise and SFi is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the ith TDF has SF structure and 0
otherwise. All other control variables are the same as defined in Equation 5.
We present the results for both performance measures in Table 7. BFs continue to be
our baseline case implying that a negative coefficient on the FOF dummy variable indicates
that BFs outperform TDFs with the FOF structure while a positive coefficient on the SF
dummy variable indicates that TDFs with the SF structure outperform BFs. From the third
and fourth columns of the table, we note that TDFs with the FOF structure under-perform
BFs by 67 basis points annually on a net-of-fee risk-adjusted basis and 117 basis points
annually on a gross-of-fee risk-adjusted basis. Similarly, from the fifth and sixth columns of
the table, we can see that the Sharpe ratio of TDFs with the FOF structure is lower than
the Sharpe ratio of BFs by 0.744, (0.764) on a net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) basis. The greater
under-performance of the gross-of-fee specification implies that expense ratios are higher for
SFs. To compute the average six-factor alpha for each of the category of funds, we evaluate
Equation 7 using the mean values for the control variables. Based on our calculations, the
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average net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) annual six-factor alpha for FOFs is −2.04 (−0.80) while that
of SFs is −1.23 (0.49) and BFs is −1.35 (0.37). In the case of TDFs with the SF structure,
the performance is not significantly different from that of BFs. Thus, we can rule out timevarying re-allocation as the main driver of the under-performance of TDFs. We also find
that TDFs with the FOF structure under-perform TDFs with the SF structure by 79, (129)
basis points annually using net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) alphas and by 0.66 (0.68) annually based
on net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) Sharpe ratios. We repeat the analysis in Equation 7 using the
bootstrapped alphas to test whether the under-performance of the FOFs relative to SFs could
occur purely by chance under the assumption that all funds have zero net-of-fee alphas. Our
results indicate that the average of the relative performance differential between the FOFs
and SFs is 0.0001 which is not significantly different from zero at the 1% confidence level.
This shows that the under-performance of the FOFs that we observe in our data is not
attributable to chance and the losses suffered by TDFs as shown in the earlier analysis is
almost entirely driven by TDFs with the FOF structure.
Since TDFs with FOF structure under-perform those with SF structure in the net-of-fee
as well as the gross-of-fee specification, the performance differential cannot be attributed
to the dual layer of fees charged by TDFs with the FOF structure. However, if the underperformance is attributed to the reduction in risk due to diversification across funds, the
shortfall of 79 to 129 basis points can be seen as the price paid by investors for this
diversification. Alternately, the under-performance might arise due to “strategic” decisions
made by the fund family. To disentangle the two explanations, we compare the performance
of the two subgroups of FOFs namely, External FOFs and Internal FOFs, with that of the
SFs in the next sub-section.
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4.5.

Costs and benefits of the fund-of-fund structure

As External FOFs came into existence only in 2005, our sample period for subsequent
analyses consists of all TDFs over the period January 2005 to December 2008. To compare
the performance of the Internal FOFs with that of External FOFs, we replace the FOF
dummy by two dummy variables called Internal and External. Internal takes the value 1
if the funds’ assets are invested entirely within the family and zero otherwise. Similarly,
External takes the value 1 if the funds’ assets are invested at least partially outside the
family and zero otherwise. We continue to use the same set of control variables as before
and estimate the following regression:
P erfit =κ0 + κ1 Internali + κ2 Externali + κ3 ExpenseRatioi,t +
κ4 LogAgei,t + κ5 LogAU Mi,t + κ6 T urnoveri,t +

(8)

κ7 N etF lowi,t + κ8 Bondi,t + κ9 F amilyAU Mi,t + i,t ,
where Internali and Externali are dummy variables as defined above and the performance
measures as well as control variables are the same as in Equation 5.
We present our results for the above model in Table 8. In this analysis, we compare
the performance of the Internal and External FOFs using TDFs with the SF structure as
the baseline case. We can see that over our sample period, TDFs with the Internal FOF
structure under-perform those with the SF structure for both net-of-fee as well as gross-offee specifications while TDFs with the External FOF structure under-perform those with
the SF structure only when we use gross-of-fee alphas. This result implies that the underperformance of the FOFs cannot be entirely due to diversification across funds.
Consistent with our hypothesis, Internal FOFs under-perform External FOFs by 55 basis
points based on net-of-fee performance and 63 basis points based on gross-of-fee performance.
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However, there is no significant difference in performance based on Sharpe ratios. This might
mean that Internal FOFs are exposed to greater systematic risk relative to External FOFs
but have lower managerial ability. To compute the average six-factor alpha for each of the
category of funds, we evaluate Equation 8 using the mean values for the control variables.
Based on our calculations, the average net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) annual six-factor alpha for
Internal FOFs is −1.65 (−1.22) while that of External FOFs is −1.10 (−0.60) and SFs is
−1.07 (0.09). We use the bootstrap analysis explained in Subsection 4.4 to test whether
the under-performance could occur purely by chance under the assumption that all TDFs
have zero net-of-fee alphas. We find that the mean relative performance differential between
Internal FOFs and External FOFs is −0.001 which is not significantly different from zero at
the 1% confidence level suggesting that our results are not attributable to chance. Based on
the results from our six-factor model, we contend that since both Internal and External FOFs
have the FOF structure and carry out portfolio rebalancing at regular intervals, the underperformance of Internal FOFs cannot be explained by reduced risk, dual layer of fees or the
timely reallocation of assets. Hence, “strategic” decisions that benefit the fund family over
the investors is the probable cause of under-performance. In the next sub-section, we turn
our attention to the selection decision of TDFs with the FOF structure. For all subsequent
analyses we use the six-factor alphas as the performance measure.

4.6.

Selection criteria of constituent funds by Internal fund-of-funds

To study the drivers of under-performance of the Internal FOFs, we analyze the selection
process by which constituent funds are determined for the Internal FOFs and test whether
fund families make these decisions to extract private benefits. To this end, we compare the
constituents of the Internal FOFs to other funds in the family that are not part of any TDF
at the point when those constituents are added. We estimate the probability that a fund
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from a family is included in an Internal FOF using the following logistic regression model:
U Fi,t =κ0 + κ1 P erfi,t−1 + κ2 ExpenseRatioi,t−1 + κ3 N etF lowi,t−1 +
(9)

κ4 LogAgei,t−1 + κ5 LogAU Mi,t−1 + κ6 T urnoveri,t−1 +
κ7 Bondi,t−1 + κ8 LogF amAU Mi,t−1 ,

where the dependent variable U Fi,t = ln



prob(F undit is a constituent of an Internal FOF)
prob(F undit is not a constituent of an Internal FOF)



is the

log odds of the ith fund being selected as a constituent of an Internal FOF in quarter t
and the explanatory and control variables are as defined in Sections 3.2 & 3.3. To avoid
forward-looking bias while using performance as an independent variable, for each fund we
re-estimate the alphas for every quarter using our six-factor model for the 24 months prior
to that quarter. We use one period lagged value for all the explanatory and control variables
as these are likely to impact the selection decision of the constituent funds. We allow for
standard errors to cluster by family and quarter. We provide the results of this analysis in
Panel A of Table 9.
These results indicate that for any fund in the family, ceteris paribus, the probability
of inclusion in the TDF is positively related to the expense ratio and negatively related to
performance and net flows. In other words, funds selected by the Internal FOFs tend to
have lower performance, higher expense ratios and lower net flows relative to other funds
in the family. Additionally, these funds are likely to be smaller, older, and have greater
allocation to bonds. Moreover, the significant negative value for coefficient of performance
in the gross-of-fee specification raises questions about the ability of the managers of these
constituent funds. If selection of poorly performing, high-expense funds as constituents by
the Internal FOFs is done to derive private benefits, we expect TDFs with the FOF structure
and investing in families outside to select funds with relatively better performance and lower
expense. We test this conjecture in the next sub-section by comparing the characteristics of
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the constituent funds of the Internal FOFs with those of the External FOFs.

4.7.

Constituents of Internal fund-of-funds versus those of External fundof-funds

To discern the determinants of including a fund in an Internal FOF versus an External
FOF, we compare their constituent funds when they are initially included in the TDF. Our
sample period for this analysis is from January 2005 to December 2008 as TDFs with the
External FOF structure came into existence only in 2005. Given that a fund is a constituent
fund for some TDF, we estimate the probability that it becomes a constituent fund of a TDF
with the Internal FOF structure using the following logistic regression model:
U Fi,t = κ0 + κ1 P erfi,t−1 + κ2 ExpenseRatioi,t−1 + κ3 N etF lowi,t−1
(10)

+ κ4 LogAgei,t−1 + κ5 LogAU Mi,t−1 + κ6 T urnoveri,t−1
+ κ7 Bondi,t−1 + κ8 LogF amAU Mi,t−1 ,

where the dependent variable U Fi,t = ln



prob(F undit is a constituent of an Internal FOF)
prob(F undit is a constituent of an External FOF)



is the log

odds of the ith fund being selected as a constituent of an Internal FOF in quarter t and the
explanatory and control variables are as defined in Sections 3.2 & 3.3.
We provide the results of this analysis in Panel B of Table 9. Consistent with our
expectations, we find that the coefficient of performance is negative indicating that fund
families are more likely to choose funds with poor performance in the case of TDFs with
the Internal FOF structure relative to TDFs with the External FOF structure. The results
are striking given the fact that we have much fewer observations (169 vs 26812) compared
to those in Panel A in which we compare constituent funds of Internal FOFs against other
funds in the family. Furthermore, in the case of expense ratio, we find that funds with higher
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expense ratios are more likely to be included in TDFs with the Internal FOF structure than
in TDFs with the External FOF structure. However, we find the probability of inclusion of
a constituent fund in a TDF with the Internal FOF structure is not additionally influenced
by the net flows to the constituent fund relative to constituents of TDFs with the External
FOF structure. Once again we find significant negative value for coefficient of performance
in the gross-of-fee specification raising questions regarding the ability of managers of the
constituent funds of Internal FOFs.
Overall, our results suggest that the under-performance of Internal FOFs could be due
to the inclusion of constituent funds that have lower performance and higher expense ratios.
These funds also have lower flows relative to other funds in the family suggesting that
some fund families may be using TDFs as a vehicle to promote poorly performing funds,
to increase revenues to the family, and to redirect flows to funds that are not favored by
investors. Inclusion of funds with poor performance in TDFs raises the question regarding
the cause of poor performance. On one hand, funds may perform poorly due to lack of
managerial skills while on the other hand the under-performance might be a consequence of
“strategic” decision by the management to use these funds to cross-subsidize certain other
funds in the family. We follow the methodology of Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) to
test whether fund families with Internal FOFs practice cross-subsidization. In untabulated
results, we find that funds in the bottom quartile of year-to-date returns within a family
that offers TDFs with the Internal FOF structure are likely to under-perform similar funds
from other families by 12 basis points per month which is suggestive of cross-subsidization.
However, we cannot rule out lack of managerial skill as the cause of poor performance and
leave the subject for future research.
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5.

Robustness checks
This section discusses several alternate specifications to show that the under-performance

of TDFs with the Internal FOF structure is robust and present our results in Table 10. In
untabulated results, we repeat all of our analysis using Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model
allowing for standard errors to cluster by families and quarters as well as family fixed-effects
model allowing for standard errors to cluster by quarters and obtain qualitatively similar
results. For ease of comparison, we begin with the results of our base model followed by
different alternate specifications. For brevity, we only report the extent of under-performance
for each case.
1. Base model: We compare the average performance of all TDFs with the average
performance of all BFs over the period January 2001 to December 2008. We use netof-fee and gross-of-fee risk adjusted performance measures in which risk adjustment is
done using our six-factor model. Thus, we have two measures of performance of which
the net-of-fee alphas are perhaps more pertinent to the investor.
2. An alternate way to control for family effects is to restrict the BFs to the families that
offer TDFs. While this restriction effectively controls for family effects, it reduces our
sample size. We present the results of this analysis as the first alternate specification
in Table 10. From these results, we can see that the under-performance persists after
controlling for family effects.
3. A shortcoming of our data is that in the case of TDFs with the FOF structure, we do
not know the share class of the constituent funds. Consistent with Wermers (2000), we
combine net returns, expense ratio, and other fund characteristics of all classes using
the weighted average in which weights are based on assets in each share class. Thus,
our analysis is at the fund level. If TDFs consistently invest in the share class with
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lowest fees, our estimates for expense ratio and gross-of-fee returns may be overstated.
To provide a lower bound, we repeat our analysis by choosing the lowest fees among
share classes as the fees for the fund and present the results in the second alternate
specification. We find the results to be qualitatively similar albeit a bit weaker for
all cases except the under-performance of the Internal FOFs in which the results are
stronger relative to the base-case.
4. In our analysis thus far, we have pooled funds with longer maturity along with shortermaturity funds. However, longer-maturity funds might be systematically different
from those with shorter-maturity. While our linear multi-factor model captures the
differences in investment styles, there might be other fundamental differences in the
two categories. Hence, we introduce an additional control variable that measures the
years remaining to the target year. Our results indicate that the documented underperformance persists even after controlling for the number of years to maturity as
shown in the third alternate specification of Table 10.
5. Another aspect that might affect our results is the approval of TDFs as QDIA in
2006 resulting in a surge in the number of TDFs. Particularly, External FOFs were
introduced only around this period. Hence, the period before 2006 might be systematically
different from the period after 2006. To control for this possibility, we exclude the
observations in the year 2006 and include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
the post-PPA period (January 2007 to December 2008) and 0 for the pre-PPA period
(January 2001 to December 2005) to our regression analysis. We are unable to present
this analysis for Internal FOFs and External FOFs due to lack of sufficient number of
External FOFs in 2005. However, our results for under-performance persists for TDFs
and FOFs as seen in the fourth alternate specification of Table 10.
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6. As an additional control for the differences in asset allocation, we repeat our analysis
using subsamples that are matched by the allocation to bonds. First, for each quarter
we select up to ten BFs whose bond allocation differs by 10% from that of a given TDF
and pool them after removing repetitions. This results in 1919 observations for TDFs
and 6259 observations for BFs. Next, we construct subsamples of BFs and TDFs with
the FOF structure whose bond allocation differs by 10% from that of a given TDF
with the SF structure. In this case, our sample consists of 319 observations for TDFs
with the SF structure, 809 observations for TDFs with the FOF structure and 2162
observations for BFs. Finally, we construct subsamples of TDFs with the SF structure
and TDFs with the Internal FOF structure whose bond allocation differs by 10% from
that of a given TDF with the Exteranl FOF structure. This sample consists of 162
observations for TDFs with the External FOF structure, 1178 observations for TDFs
with the Internal FOF structure, and 146 observations for TDFs with the SF structure.
We repeat our initial analysis on the matched samples and present the results as the
fifth specification. We find that the under-performance persists for all three cases and
is even stronger in the case of TDFs with the Internal FOF structure.
To summarize, our battery of robustness checks corroborate our key findings that TDFs
under-perform BFs. Further, variation in asset allocation over time does not seem to drive
this result as TDFs with the FOF structure are the ones with poor performance and not
TDFs with the SF structure that perform at par with BFs. Finally, dual layer of fees or
diversification across funds do not seem to explain the poor performance as TDFs with the
Internal FOF structure under-perform those with the External FOF structure both on netof-fee and gross-of-fee basis. These findings together point towards agency problems in the
TDFs, more specifically towards those structured as FOFs and investing in the funds within
their own families.
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6.

Conclusion
Retirement plan contributions to mutual funds have grown to $3.1 trillion, representing

a third of total mutual fund assets, at the end of 2008.14 During the recent financial crisis,
the significant cross-sectional variation in the performance of Target-Date Funds (TDFs),
whose assets are predominantly held in retirement accounts, led to an investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Ours is the first empirical study examining the
variation in performance across TDFs to show that agency problems may be responsible for
the poor performance of certain TDFs. In particular, we find that the problems originate in
TDFs that invest in other mutual funds within the fund family as it provides opportunities
to redirect flows to poorly performing and high-fee funds. Furthermore, we establish that
our results are not attributable to chance and are robust to alternate definition of expense
ratios, variations in family characteristics, trends over time, as well as variations in asset
allocation.
A potential reason for agency problems in TDFs is that flows do not respond to past
performance indicating that investors neither reward good performance nor punish poor
performance. However, we find that balanced funds, which is an alternate default option
available in 401(k) plans with automatic enrollment, delivers superior performance and
exhibits convex flow-performance relation indicating that its investors reward performance.
A possible reason for the convex flow-performance relation in balanced funds is that it has
considerable investor participation outside retirement plans. Hence, exposure of TDFs to
such investors might be a possible solution to mitigate agency problems. Additionally, TDFs
could be mandated to display their structure (funds investing in stocks and bonds, fund-offunds investing within their own family, or fund-of-funds investing in other families).

14

http://www.icifactbook.org/fb sec7.html
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A future area of research is to study other avenues of agency problems in TDFs. In
particular, TDFs are required to rebalance their portfolios based on a predetermined asset
allocation called the glide path. It is possible that TDFs could strategically deviate from
the glide path to serve the fund family’s incentives. These issues are part of our ongoing
research agenda.
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Table 1: Growth in Target-Date Funds (2001 - 2008)
This table presents the number of funds (# Funds) as well as the assets under management (AUM) in
billions of dollars annually during our sample period, January 2001 - December 2008. Top panel provides
the statistics for Target-Date Funds (TDF) and balanced funds (BF). Middle panel reports the statistics
for the two major subcategories of TDFs, namely funds that invest in other mutual funds (FOF) and funds
that invest in stocks and bonds (SF). Bottom panel presents the three sub-groups of TDFs with the FOF
structure; funds that invest within the family (Internal FOF), funds that invest outside the family (External
FOF), and funds that invest within the family as well as outside the family (Mixed FOF).

Years
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Years
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Years
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

TDF
# Funds AUM
16
20
41
69
112
158
200
280

FOF
# Funds AUM
7
11
28
56
99
145
187
266

Internal FOF
# Funds AUM
7
11
28
56
86
119
161
209

11.287
13.411
22.786
34.553
53.284
84.633
131.737
126.792

9.700
12.073
20.746
31.536
49.159
78.023
120.364
114.446

9.700
12.073
20.746
31.536
49.308
79.547
124.299
121.082

BF
# Funds AUM
264
277
282
301
280
285
307
383

SF
# Funds AUM
9
9
13
13
13
13
13
14

External FOF
# Funds AUM
0
0
0
0
2
12
12
19
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146.135
140.034
166.655
187.024
193.603
204.415
227.734
214.883

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.009
0.065
0.798
1.584

1.587
1.338
2.040
3.016
3.976
5.086
7.439
5.710
Mixed FOF
# Funds AUM
0
0
0
0
11
14
14
38

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.141
1.459
3.137
5.052

Table 2: Flow-Performance Relation
This table presents the relation of flows to past performance for Target-Date Funds (TDF) and balanced
funds (BF) during the period January 2003 to December 2008. In the first two columns we present the
results using linear regression model while in the last two columns we use a piece-wise linear model. Net
flows for fund i in quarter t is defined as N etf lowit = (AU Mi,t −AU Mi,t−1 ∗(1+Ri,t ))/(AU Mi,t−1 ).
For the linear model, the explanatory variable is Performance (quarterly net-of-fee six-factor alpha). For
the piece-wise linear model, we calculate the fractional ranks (RANK) within each investment objective
for each quarter. Low performance (Low Perf) is defined as Min(0.2,RANK) while Medium Performance
(Medium Perf) is defined as Min(0.6,RANK-Low Perf) and High performance (High Perf) is defined as
RANK - (Low Perf + Medium Perf). The control variables are log of prior period AUM (Log Lag AUM),
prior period expense ratio (Lag Exp Ratio), flows to funds with similar investment objective (Flows to Obj),
and the standard deviation of monthly returns for the prior 24 months (Std Dev). The standard errors are
reported in square brackets. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively.

Linear Model
BFs
TDFs
Performance

0.189∗∗∗
[0.052]

−0.094
[0.166]

Low Perf
Medium Perf
High Perf
Log Lag AUM
Lag Exp Ratio
Flows to Obj
Std Dev
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R2

−1.311∗∗∗
[0.255]
−2.765∗∗∗
[0.671]
−2.254
[6.567]
0.925∗∗∗
[0.274]
1.461
[1.431]
10321
0.021

Piece-wise Linear Model
BFs
TDFs

−4.682∗∗
[2.354]
−15.743
[11.883]
0.145
[0.194]
2.027
[2.005]
2.632
[5.287]
236
0.049
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6.150
[7.096]
4.657∗∗∗
[1.778]
19.272∗∗
[7.954]
−1.336∗∗∗
[0.259]
−2.663∗∗∗
[0.681]
−3.071
[5.936]
0.906∗∗∗
[0.253]
−2.519
[1.996]
10321
0.024

25.247
[79.257]
12.463
[10.247]
−24.913
[21.372]
−4.570∗
[2.519]
−0.161
[0.122]
0.116
[0.168]
2.374
[1.855]
−5.897
[16.864]
236
0.058

Table 3: Fund Characteristics of TDFs and BFs
This table presents the average annual fund characteristics such as performance measured using six-factor
alphas (annualized monthly alphas estimated over two-year periods using a six-factor model that includes a
bond factor and international equity factor along with the four-factors used in Carhart (1997)) and Sharpe
ratios (calculated using monthly returns), Assets in Billions (dollar value of assets in fund’s portfolio), Age in
Years (number of years since inception), Turnover Ratio (ratio of minimum purchases and sales made by the
fund to the total assets under management), Flows (net flows to the fund), Expense Ratio (percentage of fund
assets paid for operating expenses, management fees, and 12B-1 fees excluding sales charges), Equity/Bond
Component (proportion of assets allocated to equities/bonds), and Volatility of Returns (annualized monthly
volatility of fund returns) for BFs and TDFs for the years 2001 to 2008. Equity and Bond Components do not
add to 100 as a portion of assets are held as cash. For TDFs that invest in other mutual funds, constituent
expense ratio (turnover ratio) is the value-weighted average of the expense ratios (turnover ratios) of the
constituent funds. The third column provides the results of a t-test that compares the means of BFs to
TDFs. Differences marked with ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Fund Characteristics

BF

TDF

−0.881

−2.231

1.350∗∗∗

6 Factor Alpha (%) Gross

0.704

−1.811

2.515∗∗∗

Sharpe Ratio Net

0.019

−0.496

0.516∗∗∗

Sharpe Ratio Gross

0.170

−0.422

0.592∗∗∗

Assets in Billions

0.656

0.618

Age in Years

13.601

3.452

10.149∗∗∗

Turnover Ratio (%)

82.492

31.093

51.398∗∗∗

Constituent Turnover Ratio(%)

NA

76.36

NA

Flows (%)

3.451

32.352

−28.900∗∗∗

113.280

43.199

70.080∗∗∗

6 Factor Alpha (%) Net

Expense Ratio (basis points)

BF - TDF

0.038

Constituent Expense Ratio
(basis points)
Equity Component (%)

NA

69.788

NA

59.994

72.390

−12.400∗∗∗

Bond Component (%)

29.278

19.612

9.666∗∗∗

2.752

4.283

−1.530∗∗∗

Volatility of Returns (%)
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Table 4: Fund Characteristics of FOFs and SFs
This table presents the average annual fund characteristics of the two subcategories of Target-Date Funds
(TDF), namely funds that invest in other funds (FOF structure) and funds that invest in stocks and bonds (SF
structure), over the years 2001 to 2008. Performance is measured using six-factor alphas (annualized monthly
alphas estimated over two-year periods using a six-factor model that includes a bond factor and international
equity factor along with the four-factors used in Carhart (1997)) as well as Sharpe ratios (calculated using
monthly returns). Other fund characteristics compared are as defined in Table 3. Constituent expense ratio
(turnover ratio) is the value-weighted average of the expense ratios (turnover ratios) of the constituent funds.
The third column provides the results of a t-test that compares the means of FOFs with SFs. Differences
marked with ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Fund Characteristics

FOF

SF

6 Factor Alpha (%) Net

−2.442

−0.681

−1.761∗∗∗

6 Factor Alpha (%) Gross

−2.166

0.797

−2.963∗∗∗

Sharpe ratio Net

−0.587

0.035

−0.622∗∗∗

Sharpe ratio Gross

−0.523

0.171

−0.694∗∗∗

Assets in Billions

0.657

0.331

0.327∗∗∗

Age in Years

2.552

10.039

−7.487∗∗∗

Turnover Ratio (%)

28.221

45.867

−17.650∗∗∗

Constituent Turnover Ratio(%)

76.360

NA

NA

Flows (%)

36.324

4.548

31.776∗∗∗

Expense Ratio (basis points)

31.831

101.880

−70.050∗∗∗

Constituent Expense Ratio (basis points)

69.788

NA

NA

Equity Component (%)

73.717

62.648

11.069∗∗∗

Bond Component (%)

18.077

29.497

−11.420∗∗∗

4.479

2.844

1.635∗∗∗

Volatility of Returns (%)
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FOF - SF

Table 5: Fund Characteristics of Internal, External, and Mixed FOFs
This table presents the average fund characteristics for the three sub-categories of Target-Date Funds (TDF)
with fund-of-fund (FOF) structure (funds that invest within the family (Internal FOF), funds that invest
outside the family (External FOF), and funds that invest within and outside the family (Mixed FOF))
for the sample period January 2005 to December 2008. Performance is measured using six-factor alphas
(annualized monthly alphas estimated over two-year periods using a six-factor model that includes a bond
factor and international equity factor along with the four-factors used in Carhart (1997)) as well as Sharpe
ratios (calculated using monthly returns). Other fund characteristics compared are as defined in Table 3.
Constituent expense ratio (turnover ratio) is the value-weighted average of the expense ratios (turnover ratios)
of the constituent funds. Columns two, three, and four present the average values of fund characteristics for
Internal, External, and Mixed FOFs. Column five (six / seven) provides the results of a t-test that compares
the means of External (Mixed / Mixed) FOF with Internal (External / Internal) FOF. Differences marked
with ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Fund Characteristics

External

Internal

Mixed

Ext - Int

6 Factor Alpha (%) Net

−1.618

6 Factor Alpha (%) Gross

−1.907

−1.859

−0.992

−1.615

−1.555

Sharpe Ratio (%) Net

−1.005

−0.659

−0.367

−0.346∗∗

0.638∗∗∗

0.291∗

Sharpe Ratio (%) Gross

−0.943

−0.557

−0.261

−0.386∗∗

0.682∗∗∗

0.296∗

Assets in Billions

0.083

0.557

0.280

−0.473∗∗∗

0.196∗∗∗

−0.277∗∗∗

Age in Years

1.692

2.706

2.428

−1.014∗∗∗

0.737∗∗∗

−0.277

Turnover Ratio (%)

15.544

32.458

43.529

−16.910∗∗∗

27.985∗∗∗

11.071∗∗

Constituent Turnover Ratio(%)

30.962

79.229

109.170

−48.270∗∗∗

78.213∗∗∗

29.946∗∗∗

Flows (%)

34.706

23.055

42.674

11.650∗∗∗

7.9682

19.618∗∗

Expense Ratio (basis points)

60.040

28.366

25.245

31.674∗∗∗

−34.790∗∗∗

Constituent Expense Ratio
(basis points)

44.456

78.739

64.793

−34.280∗∗∗

20.337∗∗∗

Equity Component (%)

86.335

72.249

73.543

14.087∗∗∗

−12.790∗∗∗

Bond Component (%)

10.626

16.918

22.737

−6.293∗∗∗

12.112∗∗∗

5.819∗∗

4.982

4.142

4.586

0.840∗∗∗

−0.397∗∗∗

0.443∗∗∗

Volatility of Returns (%)
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Mix - Ext

Mix - Int

0.289∗∗

−0.240

0.048

0.623∗∗∗

−0.563

0.060

−3.120
−13.95∗∗∗

1.295

Table 6: Under-performance of TDFs over BFs
This table reports the results for the hypothesis that Target-Date Funds (TDF) under-perform balanced
funds (BF) using quarterly data for the period January 2001 - December 2008 with BFs as the base case.
The dependent variable fund performance is measured using six-factor alphas (annualized monthly alphas
estimated over two-year periods using a six-factor model that includes a bond factor and an international
equity factor along with Carhart’s (1997) four factors) expressed as a percentage as well as annualized Sharpe
ratios. The explanatory variable TDF is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the fund is a TDF
and 0 when the fund is a BF. The control variables include the Expense Ratio (percentage of fund assets
paid for operating expenses, management fees, and 12B-1 fees excluding sales charges), Log Age (logarithm
of fund’s age expressed in years), Log AUM (log of assets under management in billions of dollars), Turnover
(ratio of minimum purchases and sales made by the fund to its AUM expressed as percentage), Net Flow
(net flows to the fund for the quarter), Family AUM (total assets under management of the fund family in
billions of dollars), and BOND (percentage composition allocated to bonds). The second column provides the
expected sign for the explanatory variables. The third (last) column reports the results when performance is
measured on a net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) basis. White standard errors adjusted to account for autocorrelation
within clusters (“cluster” variables are fund family and quarter) are reported below the coefficients in square
brackets. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Variables

TDF
Expense Ratio
Log Age
Log AUM
Turnover
Net Flow
Log Family AUM
BOND
Constant
# of Observations
Adjusted R2

Exp
Sign
Negative

Six-factor Alpha
Net-of-fee Gross-of-fee
−0.475∗∗∗
[0.144]
−0.038
[0.067]
0.058
[0.039]
−0.013
[0.017]
−0.033
[0.035]
−0.091
[0.103]
−0.002
[0.015]
0.011∗∗∗
[0.002]
−1.141∗∗∗
[0.186]
11895
0.049

45

−0.855∗∗∗
[0.245]
1.345∗∗∗
[0.078]
0.162∗∗∗
[0.052]
−0.014
[0.020]
−0.076∗
[0.041]
−0.087
[0.121]
−0.006
[0.018]
0.014∗∗∗
[0.002]
−1.340∗∗∗
[0.203]
11895
0.329

Sharpe Ratio
Net-of-fee Gross-of-fee
−0.585∗∗
[0.235]
0.069
[0.093]
0.046
[0.036]
0.031∗
[0.018]
−0.001∗
[0.000]
0.004∗∗∗
[0.001]
−0.005
[0.012]
−0.002∗
[0.001]
0.074
[0.284]
11531
0.030

−0.602∗∗
[0.241]
0.194∗∗
[0.090]
0.048
[0.038]
0.030
[0.019]
−0.001∗
[0.000]
0.004∗∗∗
[0.001]
−0.003
[0.013]
−0.001
[0.001]
0.027
[0.283]
11531
0.036

Table 7: Under-performance of FOFs over SFs
This table reports the results for the hypothesis that Target-Date Funds (TDF) with the fund-of-fund (FOF)
structure under-perform those with the Single fund (SF) structure using quarterly data for the period January
2001 - December 2008 with balanced funds as the base case. The dependent variable fund performance is
measured using six-factor alphas (annualized monthly alphas estimated over two-year periods using a sixfactor model that includes a bond factor and an international equity factor along with Carhart’s (1997) four
factors) expressed as a percentage as well as annualized Sharpe ratios. The explanatory variable FOF (SF) is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a TDF has FOF (SF) structure and 0 otherwise. We use the
same set of control variables as in Table 6. The second column provides the expected sign for the explanatory
variables. The third (last) column reports the results when performance is measured on a net-of-fee (grossof-fee) basis. In the case of FOFs, we divide the sum of the equal weighted average of the expense ratios of
the constituent funds and the expense ratio of the fund by 12 and add to the monthly returns of the TDF to
get the gross-of-fee returns. White standard errors adjusted to account for autocorrelation within clusters
(“cluster” variables are fund families and quarters) are reported below the coefficients in square brackets.
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Variables

FOF
SF

Exp
Sign
Negative
Not Negative

Expense Ratio
Log Age
Log AUM
Turnover
Net Flow
Log Family AUM
BOND
Constant
FOF - SF
Observations
Adjusted R2

Negative

Six-factor Alphas
Net-of-fee Gross-of-fee
−0.669∗∗∗
[0.149]
0.121
[0.075]
−0.056
[0.068]
0.031
[0.038]
−0.011
[0.018]
−0.027
[0.034]
−0.063
[0.098]
−0.001
[0.016]
0.010∗∗∗
[0.002]
−1.050∗∗∗
[0.192]
−0.789∗∗∗
11895
0.056
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−1.172∗∗∗
[0.269]
0.116∗
[0.064]
1.316∗∗∗
[0.076]
0.116∗∗
[0.048]
−0.010
[0.020]
−0.065
[0.040]
−0.041
[0.121]
−0.005
[0.018]
0.013∗∗∗
[0.002]
−1.192∗∗∗
[0.199]
−1.287∗∗∗
11895
0.339

Sharpe Ratio
Net-of-fee Gross-of-fee
−0.744∗∗∗
[0.274]
−0.079
[0.057]
0.050
[0.090]
0.020
[0.036]
0.031∗
[0.017]
−0.001
[0.000]
0.004∗∗∗
[0.001]
−0.003∗∗
[0.001]
−0.004
[0.012]
0.155
[0.278]
−0.665∗∗∗
11531
0.035

−0.764∗∗∗
[0.282]
−0.084
[0.056]
0.176∗∗
[0.087]
0.022
[0.037]
0.030
[0.018]
−0.000
[0.000]
0.004∗∗∗
[0.001]
−0.001
[0.001]
−0.002
[0.013]
0.110
[0.276]
−0.680∗∗∗
11531
0.041

Table 8: Under-performance of Internal FOFs over External FOFs
This table reports the results for the hypothesis that Target-Date Funds (TDF) with the fund-of-fund (FOF)
structure that invest in funds within the family (Internal FOF) under-perform those investing in funds from
other families (External FOF). The data comprises of all TDFs over the period January 2005 - December 2008
and TDFs with the Single fund (SF) structure serves as the base case for this specification. The explanatory
variable Internal (External) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the FOF invests internally
(externally) and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable and control variables are as defined in Table 6. The
second column provides the expected sign for the explanatory variables while the third (last) column reports
the results when performance is measured on a net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) basis. We divide the sum of the equal
weighted average of the expense ratios of the constituent funds and the expense ratio of the fund by 12 and
add to the monthly returns to get the gross-of-fee returns. The difference between the coefficients on Internal
and External (Int - Ext) is also reported, and an F-test for the significance of this difference is performed.
White standard errors adjusted to account for autocorrelation within clusters (“cluster” variables are fund
families and quarters) are reported below the coefficients in square brackets. Coefficients and differences
marked with ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.

Variables

Exp
Sign

Internal

Negative

External

Not negative

Expense Ratio
Log Age
Log AUM
Turnover
Net Flow
BOND
Log Family AUM
Constant
Int - Ext
# of Observations
Adjusted R2

Negative

Six-factor Alpha
Sharpe Ratio
Net-of-fee Gross-of-fee Net-of-fee Gross-of-fee
−0.579∗∗
[0.281]
−0.033
[0.310]
−0.174
[0.312]
0.255∗
[0.154]
0.095
[0.131]
−0.027
[0.085]
−0.223
[0.182]
0.004
[0.003]
0.043
[0.075]
−1.268∗
[0.674]
−0.547∗
1974
0.176
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−1.317∗∗∗
[0.338]
−0.691∗
[0.359]
0.306
[0.324]
0.356∗∗
[0.173]
0.088
[0.145]
−0.300∗∗
[0.118]
−0.225
[0.189]
0.006∗
[0.003]
−0.005
[0.093]
−0.249
[0.738]
−0.627∗
1974
0.317

−0.859∗∗
[0.345]
−0.792∗
[0.409]
−0.011
[0.181]
−0.267
[0.167]
0.142∗∗∗
[0.044]
−0.001
[0.001]
0.006∗∗∗
[0.002]
0.008∗∗∗
[0.003]
−0.019
[0.044]
0.609
[0.556]
−0.067
2209
0.099

−0.896∗∗
[0.352]
−0.831∗∗
[0.415]
0.074
[0.189]
−0.274
[0.170]
0.142∗∗∗
[0.045]
−0.001
[0.001]
0.006∗∗∗
[0.002]
0.009∗∗∗
[0.003]
−0.021
[0.045]
0.633
[0.560]
−0.065
2209
0.100

Table 9: Determinants of Constituents of Internal FOFs
This table reports the results for the probability of a fund becoming the constituent of an Internal FOF
using quarterly data for the period January 2005 - December 2008. The dependent variable U Fi,t is defined
as the logarithm of the odds of a fund being the constituent of an Internal FOF given that it belongs to
a family that offers a TDF with Internal FOF structure in Panel A, and the logarithm of the odds of a
fund being the constituent of an Internal FOF given that it is the constituent of a TDF in Panel B. The
explanatory variables are Performance ( annualized monthly net and gross of fee alphas estimated over
the previous 24 months using a six-factor model that includes a bond factor and an international equity
factor along with Carhart’s (1997) four factors), Expense Ratio (percentage of fund assets paid for operating
expenses, management fees, and 12B-1 fees excluding sales charges for the previous quarter), and Net flows
(net flows to the fund for the previous quarter) expressed as percentages. We use one-period lagged value of
the control variables which are as defined in Table 6. The second and fifth columns provide the expected sign
for the explanatory variables while the third and sixth (fourth and last) columns report the results when
performance is measured on a net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) basis. White standard errors adjusted to account
for autocorrelation within clusters (“cluster” variables are fund family and quarter) are reported below the
coefficients in square brackets. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively.

Variables

Exp
Sign

Performance

Negative

Expense Ratio

Positive

Net Flow

Negative

Log Age
Log AUM
Turnover
BOND
Log Family AUM
Constant
# of Observations

Panel A
Net-of-fee
alphas

Gross-of-fee
alphas

−0.046∗∗∗
[0.009]
0.686∗
[0.366]
−0.720∗
[0.415]
0.724∗∗∗
[0.130]
−0.987∗∗∗
[0.153]
−0.044
[0.320]
0.023∗∗∗
[0.009]
0.048
[0.115]
2.454∗∗∗
[0.904]
26812

−0.039∗∗∗
[0.008]
1.228∗∗∗
[0.408]
−0.666
[0.419]
0.742∗∗∗
[0.132]
−0.996∗∗∗
[0.155]
−0.064
[0.308]
0.023∗∗∗
[0.009]
0.053
[0.113]
2.378∗∗∗
[0.876]
26812
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Exp
Sign
Negative
Positive
Negative

Panel B
Net-of-fee
alphas

Gross-of-fee
alphas

−0.068∗∗∗
[0.020]
3.833∗∗∗
[0.435]
0.130
[0.527]
0.683∗∗∗
[0.187]
−0.111
[0.154]
0.266
[0.229]
0.017∗∗∗
[0.005]
0.046
[0.079]
−4.755∗∗∗
[1.478]
169

−0.063∗∗∗
[0.012]
4.532∗∗∗
[0.519]
0.228
[0.556]
0.719∗∗∗
[0.192]
−0.098
[0.162]
0.250
[0.222]
0.017∗∗∗
[0.005]
0.028
[0.089]
−4.643∗∗∗
[1.443]
169

Table 10: Tests for Robustness
This table presents the robustness of our results for various alternate specifications. For ease of comparison,
we report only the coefficients of the extent of under-performance for all cases. The baseline refers to the
specification in which performance is measured using annualized monthly alphas estimated over two-year
periods using a six-factor model that includes a bond factor and an international equity factor along with
Carhart’s (1997) four factors. Coefficients and differences marked with ***, **, and * are significant at 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively.

Specifications

Baseline:
Net-of-fee
Gross-of-fee
# of observations

TDF
-BF

Adj
R2

FOF
-SF

Adj
R2

−0.475∗∗∗ 0.049 −0.789∗∗∗ 0.056
−0.855∗∗∗ 0.329 −1.287∗∗∗ 0.339
11895
11895

Internal FOF
- External FOF

Adj
R2

−0.547∗
−0.627∗
1974

0.176
0.317

Alternate 1: TDFs are compared to BFs offered by the same family.
Net-of-fee
−0.159∗ 0.030 −0.407∗∗∗ 0.034
−0.812∗∗
∗∗∗
Gross-of-fee
−0.166
0.282 −0.456
0.285
−0.831∗∗
# of observations
4402
4402
1348

0.131
0.305

Alternate 2: Using share class with minimum fees.
Net of Fee
−0.196∗∗ 0.026 −0.485∗∗∗ 0.029
Gross of Fee
−0.178∗ 0.296 −0.484∗∗∗ 0.298
# of observations
11537
11537

−0.822∗∗
−0.839∗∗
1350

0.135
0.309

Alternate 3: Controlling
Net of Fee
Gross of Fee
# of observations

for years to maturity.
−0.311∗∗ 0.050 −0.806∗∗∗ 0.058
−0.675∗∗∗ 0.330 −1.306∗∗∗ 0.341
11895
11895

−0.544∗∗
−0.624∗
1974

0.189
0.330

Alternate 4: Controlling
Net of Fee Pre-PPA
Net of Fee Post-PPA
Gross of Fee Pre-PPA
Gross of Fee Post-PPA
# of observations

for time trends.
−0.183
0.108
−0.221∗∗
−0.218
0.392
−0.718∗∗∗
10032

Alternate 5: Controlling
Net of Fee
Gross of Fee
# of observations

for asset allocation.
−0.314∗∗ 0.056 −0.512∗∗ 0.079
−0.697∗∗∗ 0.312 −0.988∗∗∗ 0.349
8178
3290

−0.849∗∗
−0.932∗∗
1486

0.112
0.183

−0.686∗∗∗ 0.112
−0.194∗
−0.762∗∗∗ 0.396
−0.737∗∗∗
10032
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